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NOTE
The Power to Tax Is the Power to Foreclose:




Mother, may I go out to swim?
Yes, my darling daughter;
Hang your clothes on a hickory limb,
And don't go near the water.'
This nursery rhyme, invoked by the Second Circuit in
its decision in Oneida Indian Nation of New York v.
Madison County & Oneida County, New York,' captures the
t J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, University at Buffalo Law School; B.A., 2009,
Le Moyne College.
1. The author of this nursery rhyme is unknown. The works it appears in
include PARKER M. FILLMORE, THE HICKORY LIMB (1907), available at
www.gutenberg.org/files/28886/28886-8.txt.
2. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 159 & n.7
(2d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). Following the Second Circuit's
decision in the case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether tribal immunity from suit protected OIN from foreclosure
actions to collect property taxes. Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.,
131 S. Ct. 459 (2010). Shortly thereafter, OIN passed an ordinance waiving its
sovereign immunity with respect to such foreclosure actions. See infra Part
III.C. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated its judgment granting cert and
remanded the case to the Second Circuit to "revisit its ruling on sovereign
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essence of the illogical result the court reached. While the
court conceded that the counties could collect real property
taxes on the fee (non-reservation) land owned by the Oneida
Indian Nation of New York ("OIN"), it held they could not
initiate foreclosure proceedings on the land because of OIN's
immunity from suit?
In the 1990s, OIN began to acquire land that had been
part of the original Oneida Nation over 200 years ago.4 The
Nation operates several commercial enterprises on or near
this land, including Turning Stone Casino, two hotels, golf
courses, gas stations, and convenience stores.' But it has
failed to pay property taxes on the land.' OIN first argued
that the land held the status of "reservation land," and was
exempt from state taxation.! In City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York, however, the United States
Supreme Court held that "standards of federal Indian law
and federal equity practice preclude[d] the Tribe from
rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold,"
and as such, the land was taxable as if owned by any other
private owner.' Even after Sherrill, OIN continued to refuse
to pay property taxes on the land, which led Oneida and
Madison Counties to begin foreclosure proceedings.' This
time, OIN argued, inter alia, that it was not subject to the
foreclosure proceedings because of its tribal immunity from
immunity on light of this new factual development." Madison Cnty. v. Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704, 704 (2011); see also infra Part III.C.
3. Id. at 159-60.
4. Id. at 153.
5. Brief of Amici Curiae Town of Verona, New York et al. in Support of
Petitioners Madison County and Oneida County, New York at 6, Madison Cnty.
v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 10-72) [hereinafter
Brief of Town of Verona].
6. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 154-55.
7. Id. at 153 ("[B]ecause the [United States Supreme] Court ... recognized
the Oneidas' aboriginal title to their ancient reservation land and because the
Tribe has now acquired the specific parcels involved in this suit in the open
market, it has unified fee and aboriginal title and may now assert sovereign
dominion over the parcels." (quoting City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 213 (2005))).
8. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
9. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 154-55.
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suit." The Second Circuit agreed, drawing a fine distinction
between the doctrines of sovereign authority over reservation
lands (which Sherrill said OIN lacked because the lands
were not reservation lands) and sovereign immunity from
suit, which protected OIN from foreclosure proceedings
brought against it."
This distinction is merely "illusory," however. And in
drawing the distinction, the Second Circuit missed a more
critical distinction-between in personam actions, to which
tribal sovereign immunity from suit applies, and property-
based in rem actions, to which immunity does not attach. 3
The Second Circuit's decision, which allows Indians to evade
lawfully owed property taxes, has devastating consequences
for local governments because it denies them the tax
revenues necessary to provide the appropriate amount of
services. 4 In addition, the decision encourages a disregard
for similar legitimate enforcement actions," creating a
"checkerboard" of competing jurisdictions.
10. Id. at 155. OIN's other arguments are beyond the scope of this Note.
These arguments, which the district court also found to preclude foreclosure,
were (1) the Nonintercourse Act rendered the OIN's properties inalienable, (2)
the Due Process Clause was violated by the counties failure to give adequate
notice, and (3) the land cannot be taxed under New York State law. Id. at 155;
see also infra note 83.
11. Id. at 157 ("[The doctrine of sovereign authority over reservation lands] is
different, however, from the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit.").
12. Brief for the State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 3, Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704
(2011) (No. 10-72) [hereinafter Brief for the State of New York et al.].
13. See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 265 (1992) (highlighting the distinction between in
personam and in rem jurisdiction); In re Burg, 295 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Because tax foreclosures in New York are inherently
proceeding in rem, the property owner is not a defendant."); see also Brief for the
Petitioners at 20-21, Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct.
704 (2011) (No. 10-72) ("[Tlhis Court in Yakima recognized the distinction
between an in rem proceeding involving real estate held by a tribe, on the one
hand, and an in personam proceeding against a tribe, on the other hand....
[An in rem proceeding to take title to property for unpaid taxes is directed to
the 'res,' not the tribe, and is not disruptive of tribal self-government." (footnote
omitted)).
14. See Brief of Town of Verona, supra note 5, at 4-8.
15. See Brief of the California State Ass'n of Counties as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 12, Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.,
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Part I of this Note will provide an overview of some
important concepts in Indian law, particularly the doctrine
of tribal immunity from suit and the different types of
Indian land. Part II will outline the Second Circuit's
majority opinion and concurrence in Madison County,
noting the concurring judges' plea that the Supreme Court
"reunite[ ]" "law and logic."" Part III will demonstrate that
tax assessment and tax enforcement are merely two sides of
the same coin, such that the power to tax also includes the
power to enforce the collection of taxes. Part IV will explain
how the in rem nature of foreclosure proceedings prevents
OIN from asserting tribal immunity from suit as a defense.
Finally, Part V considers the harm to local governments
that results from the Second Circuit's decision.
I. INDIAN LAW CONCEPTS
A. Tribal Immunity from Suit
Tribal immunity from suit, which evolved from the
federal common law,'" allows an Indian tribe to raise
immunity as a defense." Essentially, therefore, Indian
tribes cannot be sued.20 The "passing reference"" to tribal
131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 10-72) [hereinafter Brief of the California State Ass'n
of Counties] (discussing impact on environmental enforcement); Brief of Town of
Verona, supra note 5, at 11 (discussing impact on zoning, municipal planning,
and public health ordinances).
16. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1976) ('"Such an impractical pattern of
checkerboard jurisdiction,' was contrary to the intent embodied in the existing
federal statutory law of Indian jurisdiction." (quoting Seymour v.
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (citation
omitted))).
17. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 164 (2010),
vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (Cabranes, J., concurring).
18. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661,
662-63 & n.6 (2002).
19. Eric Governo, Comment, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: History, Competing
Policies, and Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 34
NEw ENG. L. REV. 175, 176 (1999).
20. Id.
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immunity from suit in Turner v. United States22 was more
clearly articulated in United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., which stated explicitly: "These Indian
Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional
authorization." 23 The latest iteration of the doctrine of tribal
immunity from suit comes from the 1998 United States
Supreme Court case Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., in which the Court
stated: "As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is
subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit
or the tribe has waived its immunity."24 In Kiowa, the
Supreme Court also explained that the location and nature
of the tribe's activities are irrelevant in determining its
immunity from suit.25 The Court held that the Kiowa tribe
could not be sued for breach of contract, even though the
contract was made off-reservation and dealt solely with
commercial, rather than governmental, activities.
It has been argued that tribal immunity from suit
should be narrowed because in many instances, Indians are
significant commercial actors less in need of protection. As
the Supreme Court stated in Montana v. United States,
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes." 27 For
example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the Supreme Court
held that tribal immunity from suit prevented the
Oklahoma Tax Commission from suing the Potawatomi
Tribe to collect unpaid state taxes, even though the taxes
were lawfully imposed on cigarettes sold on-reservation to
21. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998)
('Turner's passing reference to immunity, however, did become an explicit
holding that tribes had immunity from suit.").
22. 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919) ("Without authorization from Congress, the
[Creek] Nation could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its
consent.").
23. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (citations
omitted).
24. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754.
25. Id. at 754-55.
26. Id. at 760.
27. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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both Indians and non-Indians. 28 The State of Oklahoma
argued that tribal sovereign immunity should be restricted
because "tribal business activities . . . are now so detached
from traditional tribal interests that the tribal sovereignty
doctrine no longer makes sense in this context."29
Yet despite these critiques, the Supreme Court has
"retained the doctrine . . . on the theory that Congress had
failed to abrogate it in order to promote economic
development and tribal self-sufficiency." But that does not
prevent the common law doctrine from being limited in the
future. It rests on an "unsound foundation,"' that
"develop[ed] almost by accident."" Even in Kiowa, a decision
that upheld tribal immunity from suit, the Court stated
that "[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of
perpetuating the doctrine" because "tribal immunity
extends beyond what is needed to safeguard tribal self-
governance."" Several Justices in concurring and dissenting
opinions have also questioned the legitimacy of the doctrine
of tribal immunity from suit in today's world."
B. Categories of Indian Land
A state's power to tax Indian land depends on the status
of the land. Land that is considered part of "Indian
country," which includes reservation land and trust land,"
28. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 508-14 (1995).
29. Id. at 510; see also Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758 ("Tribal enterprises now
include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians." (citations
omitted)). Indians in New York and California are also commercially active. See
Brief of the California State Ass'n of Counties, supra note 15, at 4, 6; Brief of
Town of Verona, supra note 5, at 6.
30. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58 (citing Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 510).
31. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 28.
32. Id. (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756).
33. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758.
34. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 28-29. For example, "Justice
Blackmun doubted 'the continuing vitality in this day of the doctrine of tribal
immunity' and believed 'the doctrine may well merit re-examination in an
appropriate case.' Id. (quoting Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game of Wash.,
433 U.S. 165, 178-79 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
35. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw § 3.04(2)(c) (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
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is exempt from state taxation." But "tribal property outside
of Indian country is generally subject to state taxation,"
including real property taxes."
1. Reservation Lands. The prohibition of state taxes on
reservation lands is the most basic. "'[A]bsent cession of
jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it,' . . . a
[s]tate is without power to tax reservation lands."" Whether
or not OIN's land was considered reservation land was at
the heart of the Sherrill case." In Sherrill, OIN argued that
its non-payment of property taxes was justified because
although it purchased the parcels at issue on the open
market, the parcels were part of the original Oneida
Reservation.40 In its view, the sale of this reservation land
by the Oneida Indians (from which OIN descends) in the
early nineteenth century violated the Nonintercourse Act,
which required federal approval (none was obtained) before
any tribal land could be sold.41 Thus, OIN concluded that
because it owned the "ancient reservation land," it could
once again "assert sovereign dominion over the parcels,"42
which would exempt them from taxation."3 The Supreme
Court disagreed because it had been too long since the
Oneidas exercised sovereign dominion over the land-a
period of time during which neither the Oneida Nation nor
OIN made any claim for it." In the meantime,
36. Id. § 803(1)(b).
37. Id. § 803(2)(b).
38. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411
U.S. 145, 148 (1973)).
39. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 554 U.S. 197, 211-14
(2005).
40. Id.; see also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149,
153 (2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
41. Sherrill, 554 U.S. at 204-11; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 152-53.
42. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213.
43. See Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153. The Second Circuit had agreed with
OIN's argument. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139,
153-58 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
44. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153. The
Court held that '"standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice'
preclude[d] the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew
cold." Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 (citations omitted).
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"developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several
generations . . . render inequitable the piecemeal shift in
governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.""5 Thus,
the land was not reservation land, but remained fee land
purchased on the open market.'
2. Trust Lands. Congress, however, devised a way for
Indians to purchase land on the open market and obtain the
protected status of reservation lands.4 25 U.S.C. § 465
allows the Secretary of the Interior to collect land in trust
for Indians, which "shall be exempt from State and local
taxation."" Thus, as the Court in Sherrill stated, "Section
465 provides the proper avenue for OIN to reestablish
sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas
200 years ago.""
3. Fee Lands. Finally, tribes can own land in fee, which
provides no protection from state taxation."o In Cass County
Joint Water Resource District v. 1.43 Acres of Land in
Highland Township, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
characterized fee land as land "purchased in fee by an
Indian tribe, but which is not reservation land . . . or trust
land[.]"" When a tribe's land is simply in fee, the tribe is
just like any other owner of private property who must pay
property taxes. For example, the United States Supreme
Court in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
45. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221.
46. See id. at 214 ("We now reject the unification theory of OIN."); see also
Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153-54.
47. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220.
48. 25 U.S.C § 465 (2006).
49. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221. OIN had applied for trust status for the land at
issue. See Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 155-56. On May 20, 2008, the Department
of the Interior approved the taking of 13,003.89 acres of land owned by OIN,
which, as trust land, will no longer be subject to taxation. Id. OIN will secure
the payment of taxes, penalties, and interest due on the land, as is necessary to
satisfy the requirements for the trust. Id. at 156. The Second Circuit noted that
even though "it appears that the Counties will receive back payment of all taxes,
penalties, and interest due on the property at issue in this lawsuit.... [Wie
reiterate that it does not render moot any of the issues raised on nor affect our
consideration of this appeal," Id.
50. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, § 803(2)(b).
51. Cass Cnty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 1 6,
643 N.W.2d 685, 688.
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of the Yakima Indian Nation held that a county can "impose
an ad valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee."52
Similarly, the Court in Sherrill held that OIN's land was
not reservation land, and thus not exempt from state
taxation."
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN ONEIDA INDIN
NATION OF NEW YORK V. MADISON COUNTY & ONEIDA
CouNTY NEW YORK
By holding that the counties could not foreclose on
parcels of OIN land for non-payment of taxes,54 the Second
Circuit in Madison County refused to recognize the obvious
implications of Sherrill, which allowed the counties to levy
property taxes on the land at issue." In its opinion, the
Second Circuit drew a misleading distinction between
sovereign dominion over tribal lands and tribal immunity
from suit. At the same time, it failed to make the critical
distinction between in personam actions and in rem actions.
For in personam actions, tribal immunity from suit is an
appropriate defense. But because in rem actions are against
the property-not the person or group with immunity-
tribal immunity from suit is irrelevant."6 Missing this
distinction led the judges of the Second Circuit to a result-
that governments had the power to tax without the means
to ensure collection of those taxes-that they themselves
characterized as "inconsistent and contradictory,""
52. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992). "Fee-patented" refers to land held in fee by an
individual Indian as opposed to land held in trust for a tribe under 25 U.S.C. §
465. The "patented" part of the designation refers to the "obsolete federal
allotment policy, whereby reservation land was divided into allotments to be
held in trust by the Government for a period of 25 years." Christopher A. Karns,
Note, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation: State Taxation as a Means of Diminishing the Tribal Land Base, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1213, 1213 n.5 (1993).
53. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221.
54. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 159.
55. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214.
56. See infra Part IV.
57. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 159.
2012] 233
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"def[ying] common sense," "anomalous," and divorced from
"law and logic."5 8
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion
The Second Circuit began by addressing the background
of the "lengthy dispute over the payment of state and local
taxes" by OIN." First, the court noted that after the Treaty
of Fort Schuyler, the Oneida Nation had a reservation of
300,000 acres in central New York State."o But, in violation
of the Nonintercourse Act, which required federal approval
before the sale of reservation land, the Oneida Nation sold
some of that land to New York State and private owners,
who eventually sold the land to non-Indians.6 ' OIN was
eventually left with thirty-two acres by 1920. In the late
twentieth century, OIN initiated a two-pronged attack to
reassert dominion over their former reservation lands.
First, they filed suit claiming they had a right to the lands
sold by the Oneida Nation in the early 1800s because the
Oneida Nation had not obtained the federal authorization
required by the Nonintercourse Act."3 In addition, OIN
began to purchase former Oneida reservation lands on the
open market."
To provide context for the issue in Madison County, the
court next reviewed the case of City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation of New York," decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 2005. The lands in that case, located in
the City of Sherrill in Oneida County, New York, were part
of the 300,000 acres of the post-Fort Schuyler reservation,
but were sold in 1807 to a non-Indian.66 In 1997 and 1998,
58. Id. at 163-64 (Cabranes, J., concurring). Judge Hall joined this
concurrence. Id. at 163.
59. Id. at 151 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 152.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 153.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
66. Id. at 211; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 152-53.
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OIN repurchased the land."7 It then commenced an action in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the
parcels were exempt from state and local property taxes."
Because the land was Indian country due to OIN's "unified
fee and aboriginal title"' of the recently repurchased land,o
OIN argued that the land was not taxable." The Supreme
Court rejected that argument, on the theory that the
"doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility" made
it inequitable for state and local government to suddenly be
subject to a "piecemeal shift in governance . . . ."72 The
Supreme Court emphasized that because it had been so
long-200 years-since the Oneida Nation had jurisdiction
over the land the "embers of sovereignty" had "long ago
gr[own] cold.""
The Second Circuit next described the steps towards
foreclosure taken by Madison and Oneida Counties. Ever
since OIN purchased the Madison County parcels, Madison
County had begun foreclosure proceedings against the
delinquent parcels yearly in state court, but would delay the
resolution of the foreclosures, waiting for a decision in
Sherrill.74 Beginning in 2003 (when the court separated the
Madison County and Sherrill litigation)," Madison County
ceased abandoning the yearly foreclosure proceedings
against the OIN lands in Madison County." Thus, that year,
the county sent a Petition and Notice of Foreclosure to OIN,
67. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 197; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153.
68. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 211-12; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153;
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 145 F. Supp. 2d 226, 254-59
(N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 337 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 197.
69. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213.
70. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153.
71. Id.
72. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153-54.
73. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 153.
74. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 154 (citation omitted).
75. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 171 (2d
Cir.), rev'd, 544 U.S. 197 (2003) (remanding the litigation between OIN and the
counties back to the district court which separated the counties' litigation from
that of the City of Sherrill).
76. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 154 (citation omitted).
2012] 235
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and in 2005, moved for summary judgment on the
foreclosure proceedings in state court." However, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York issued a preliminary injunction enjoining those
foreclosure proceedings."
Oneida County uses a somewhat unusual foreclosure
proceeding, where the county has a tax auction for the sale
of property with delinquent taxes of greater than six
months." Oneida County followed this procedure for all
OIN-owned property within the county.80 In 2005, the
County delivered Final Notices Before Redemption to OIN,
who subsequently obtained a restraining order that stopped
any additional foreclosure efforts until the resolution of the
Madison County case."
Next, the Madison County court provided an overview of
the two district court proceedings. The Northern District
had granted summary judgment in favor of OIN in both
proceedings, holding that the counties could not initiate or
continue foreclosure proceedings against OIN for four
reasons." The reasoning relevant to this Note is that tribal
immunity from suit prevented the foreclosure proceedings.83
The counties appealed, and the State of New York joined as
amicus curiae. The United States, at the direction of the
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 376 F. Supp. 2d 280, 283
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (preliminary injunction); see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at
154 (citations omitted).
79. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 154-55 (citation omitted).
80. Id. at 155.
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 155. The two decisions by the district court that the Second Circuit
consolidated on appeal and affirmed in Madison County were Oneida Indian
Nation v. Oneida County, 432 F. Supp. 2d 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), and Oneida
Indian Nation of New York u. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y.
2005).
83. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 155. The other reasons preventing the
counties from pursuing foreclosure were: (1) the lands in question were
inalienable by virtue of the Nonintercourse Act, (2) the counties violated the
Due Process Clause because they did not give OIN notice of the end of the
redemption period, and (3) the land at issue was exempt from taxation by the
State of New York. Id.
84. Id.
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Second Circuit, also submitted an amicus curiae brief that
argued for an affirmance of the district court's decisions."
The Second Circuit then discussed developments that, while
not making the issues in this case moot, "affect[ed] the
practical implications of this Court's decision . . . .""
The Second Circuit then examined tribal sovereign
immunity and the application of this immunity to the case."
The court noted that the counties invoked Sherrill, arguing
that the power of taxation recognized by that case meant
that the counties were able to initiate foreclosure
proceedings to collect those taxes." But, said the court, "[w]e
think this argument improperly conflates two distinct
doctrines: tribal sovereign authority over reservation lands
and tribal sovereign immunity from suit," and the immunity
rejected in Sherrill was related to the former." The court
cited a line of cases, including Worcester v. Georgia" and
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones," that demonstrated that
Indians have ultimate control over reservation lands.
Further, the Supreme Court has .'categorical[1y]'
maintained that '[a]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other
federal statutes permitting it, . . . a State is without power
to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians."' The
Second Circuit explained that this is the type of sovereignty
that underlies the Sherrill decision."
The Second Circuit distinguished the above doctrine of
tribal sovereignty over its lands, which is "closely tied to the
85. Id.
86. Id. at 155-56. For further discussion of these developments, see supra
note 49.
87. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 156-60. The Second Circuit's examination of
abstention, id. at 160-61, and the Stockbridge Band's motion to intervene, id. at
161-63, are outside the scope of this Note and will not be discussed.
88. Id. at 156.
89. Id.
90. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832).
91. 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
92. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 156-57 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 157 (quoting Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)).
94. See id. (noting that tribal immunity from suit is distinct from tax
exemption of tribal land).
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question of whether the specific parcel at issue is 'Indian
reservation land,"' from a tribe's immunity from suit, which
is "independent of its lands."" The court used the Supreme
Court's decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.," to further explicate the
doctrine of tribal immunity from suit." Kiowa outlined the
"distinctive history" of tribal immunity from suit, beginning
with its "passing reference" in Turner v. United States," to
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.'s"
"explicit holding" that Indian tribes were immune from
suit.'" The Kiowa Court had pointed to Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma"o' as a recent challenge to this doctrine, but noted
the doctrine remained intact "on the theory that Congress
had failed to abrogate it."l02
The Second Circuit continued to highlight the Kiowa
Court's ruling. The Kiowa Court had recognized that tribal
immunity from suit might need to be limited, for example,
by "confin[ing] it to reservations or to noncommercial
activities," but it deferred to Congress to make thatjudgment.o3 The Second Circuit then emphasized Kiowa's
distinction between tribal sovereignty over lands and tribal
immunity from suit: "To say substantive state laws apply
... is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from
suit.... There is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to
enforce them."'" Thus, based on its interpretation of Kiowa,
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
97. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 158-59.
98. 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
99. 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
100, Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757 ("Turner's passing reference to immunity,
however, did become an explicit holding that tribes had immunity from suit.");
see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 158 (citations omitted).
101. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
102. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 158 (quoting
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757).
103. Kiowa, 525 U.S. at 758; see also Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 158 (quoting
Kiowa, 525 U.S. at 758).
104. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d at 158 (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755).
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the Second Circuit found that Sherrill did not "implicitly
abrogat[e] the OIN's immunity from suit,""os as Sherrill
concerned the "right to demand compliance with state
laws"o' (i.e., taxation) and not "the means available to
enforce them."'
In applying the above analysis to the facts in Madison
County, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the power to
tax but not foreclose is "inconsistent and contradictory,"
seemingly .'eviscerates' Sherrill" and "mak[es] that
essential right of government [to tax properties]
meaningless."" It noted, however, that the Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument in Potawatomi when they held
that a government entity could not use foreclosure
proceedings to recover unpaid state taxes on cigarettes sold
on the Potawatomi reservation.' The Court in Potawatomi
denied that Oklahoma was given a "right without any
remedy," explaining that just because Oklahoma could not
pursue the most efficient remedy did not mean it had no
remedy at all." Similarly, the Second Circuit explained
that Madison and Oneida Counties had alternatives other
than foreclosure: they could sue individual tribal members
and tribal officers in their official capacities, or appeal to
Congress to limit tribal immunity from suit." The Second
Circuit then affirmed the district court's decisions in favor
of OIN, on the basis of its immunity from suit."2
B. Judge Cabranes's Concurrence
The concurrence in this case, which Judge Hall joined,
is noteworthy for its dramatic appeal to the Supreme Court.
105. Id. at 159.
106. Id. (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755).
107. Id. (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755).
108. Id. (quoting Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-
Counterclaimants-Appellants at 51, Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v Madison
Cnty., 605 F.3d. 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-6408-cy)).
109. Id. (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.,
498 U.S. 505, 512-14 (1995)).
110. Id. at 160 (quoting Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 514).




Judge Cabranes recognized that something is seriously
wrong with the decision; it "defie[d] common sense."13 Yet
his hands were tied: "But absent action by our highest
Court, or by Congress, it is the law.""' The "unambiguous
guidance" from the Supreme Court in Kiowa and
Potawatomi led him also to conclude that "although the
Counties may tax the property at issue here, they may not
foreclose on those properties because the tribe is immune
from suit.""' But he continued, characterizing that result as
"anomalous," lamenting that "intermediate appellate
courts" are not "empowered to revisit" the decisions in
Kiowa and Potawatomi, and exhorting the Supreme Court
or Congress to "reunite" "law and logic. . . in this area of the
law."' "6
III. TAx ASSESSMENT AND TAX ENFORCEMENT ARE Two SIDES
OF THE SAME COIN
The reason the Second Circuit's result in Madison
County "defies common sense""' is because the court
mistakenly treated assessment of taxes and foreclosure to
collect unpaid taxes as separate, each informed by separate
doctrines. To the Second Circuit, the counties' ability to
assess taxes on the land at issue is supported by Sherrill as
a limit on a tribe's sovereign authority over its land, which
depends on whether a "specific parcel at issue is 'Indian
reservation land.""' By contrast, the enforcement
mechanism-the foreclosure proceedings to collect the
unpaid taxes-is controlled by a different doctrine, a tribe's
sovereign immunity from suit."' This conclusion is a
misreading of prior case law, contrary to the analogous
doctrines of foreign and state sovereign immunity, and
113. Id. at 163 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 164 (citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id. at 157 (majority opinion) (quoting Cass Cnty. v. Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110 (1998)).
119. Id. at 158 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751,
755 (1998)).
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inconsistent with OIN's recent decision to allow foreclosure
actions against them to proceed.
A. Prior Case Law
The Supreme Court in Sherrill confirmed that the
enforcement through foreclosure of a government's taxation
power over fee lands owned by Indians is included within
their power to tax. The Court explained that "the equitable
cast of the relief sought [tribal immunity] remains the same
whether asserted affirmatively [against the taxation] or
defensively [against the enforcement of the taxation, i.e.,
collection proceedings]."120 This explanation was a rejection
of Justice Stevens's dissenting argument that tribal
immunity from suit could still simply be "raised by a tribe
as a defense against a state collection proceeding."'2' Thus,
because the tribe could not use immunity from suit to avoid
collection, the majority implicitly recognized that taxation
and enforcement proceedings like collection or foreclosure
were part of the same right. The Department of Interior
similarly understood that the counties' powers recognized in
Sherrill included foreclosure proceedings: "[lit is our opinion
that the Court in City of Sherrill unmistakably held that
the lands at issue are subject to real property taxes. In the
event the taxes are not paid, we believe such lands are
subject to foreclosure." 22
The Sherrill Court's conclusion is supported by County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation.'23 In Yakima, the Supreme Court faced a
question similar to the one presented in Madison County:
whether a county could impose an ad valorem tax on
Indian-owned non-reservation, non-trust lands. 24 The lands
at issue in that case were "fee-patented," 25 and, like the fee
120. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 214 & n.7
(2005).
121. Id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 16-17 (quoting Letter from
James E. Cason, Associate Deputy, Secretary of the Interior, to Ray Halbritter,
OIN representative (June 10, 2005)).
123. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
124. Id. at 253-56.
125. See supra note 52 for a discussion of fee-patented lands.
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lands at issue in Madison County, were "alienable and
encumberable," which "rendered them subject to assessment
and forced sale for taxes."'26 Thus, Yakima confirms that the
ability to foreclose upon land for non-payment of property
taxes is "concomitant" with the power to tax those lands in
the first place.'27
Additional cases have confirmed that taxation and
foreclosure are two sides of the same coin; that the power to
tax necessarily includes the ability to foreclose. In Anderson
& Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, the
Supreme Court of Washington stated: "[T]he decision in
County of Yakima . .. based state jurisdiction to tax and
foreclose on reservation fee land exclusively in rem."128
Similarly, in Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. Village
of Hobart, Wisconsin, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that lands owned in
fee by Oneida Indians in Wisconsin could be subject to
forced alienation through condemnation.' In the Eastern
District's view, "implicit in the Court's holding [in Sherrill]
that Indian fee lands are subject to ad valorem property
taxes is the further holding that such lands can be forcibly
sold for nonpayment of such taxes."' The district court
continued: "Land is either exempt from state law, or it is
not.... [I]t hardly makes sense to permit taxation while at
the same time prohibiting the only means of collecting such
taxes.""' Thus, foreclosure is clearly part of a government's
power to assess property taxes, or else, as the court
explains, the holdings from Yakima, Sherrill, and similar
cases are "nothing more than an elaborate academic parlor
game.""' "Unless a state or local government is able to
126. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
127. Reply Brief at 4, Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131
S.Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 10-72) (citing Yakima, 502 U.S. at 256, 263-64).
128. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d
379, 386 (Wash. 1996) (emphasis added).
129. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Village of Hobart, Wis., 542 F. Supp. 2d
908, 921, 934 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
130. Id. at 921.
131. Id. (citing Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146, 149 (1906)).
132. Id.
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foreclose on Indian property for nonpayment of taxes, the
authority to tax such property is meaningless." 3
B. The Result in Madison County Would Give Indian
Tribes "Super-sovereignty" Greater than That of Foreign
Nations or States
The holding that Madison County and Oneida County
may tax, but not foreclose on, OIN's property is inconsistent
with principles of foreign and state sovereignty, as it confers
upon Indian tribes a degree of sovereignty far greater than
that afforded to foreign countries or states. Indeed, the
counties argue that "OIN offers no explanation why it
should enjoy 'super-sovereign' immunity greater than that
of a state." This is particularly significant because tribal
immunity is not considered as strong or as broad as either
foreign or state sovereign immunity.' Though the doctrines
of foreign sovereign immunity and state sovereign
immunity are separate from tribal sovereign immunity,
courts have held that they "provide a helpful point of
reference.""'
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity. Courts have often used
the limits of foreign soverei n immunity in their analyses of
tribal sovereign immunity. X As the amicus curiae Town of
Lenox, New York explained, "[u]nder international law, a
[foreign] state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the
133. Id.
134. Reply Brief, supra note 127, at 8 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 466 (1995)).
135. See Chickasaw, 515 U.S. at 466 ("We do not read the Treaty as conferring
super-sovereign authority to interfere with another jurisdiction's sovereign right
to tax income, from all sources, of those who choose to live within that
jurisdiction's limits."); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v.
Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890-91 (1986) ("[B]ecause of the peculiar 'quasi-
sovereign' status of the Indian tribes, the Tribe's immunity is not congruent
with that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy." (citations
omitted)); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Town of Lenox, New York in Support
of Petitioners Madison County and Oneida County, New York at 5, 14-15
Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (No. 10-
72) [hereinafter Brief of Town of Lenox] (citing Chickasaw and Three Affiliated
Tribes).
136. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005).
137. Brief of Town of Lenox, supra note 135, at 5 (citations omitted).
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courts of another state with respect to claims . . . to
immovable property in the state of the forum," so long as
the property is not used for diplomatic or consular
purposes.'" The town continued: "This lack of immunity
extends to the enforcement, not simply the rendition of
judgments."' Essentially, a foreign government that did
not pay real property taxes on its land is not immune from
foreclosure proceedings, so long as the land is not part of the
consular lands.140 Thus, enforcement mechanisms are meant
to be included in a "sovereign's 'primeval' interests in
controlling real property within its jurisdiction." 4' In 1976,
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") 42 made this
"immovable property" exception from foreign sovereign
immunity part of federal statutory law.'43 Federal common
and statutory law demonstrate that foreign sovereign
immunity does not automatically protect a foreign nation
from enforcement proceedings. Therefore, because tribal
sovereign immunity is no greater than foreign sovereign
immunity, an enforcement proceeding like foreclosure for
nonpayment of property taxes should not trigger a tribe's
immunity from suit.
2. State Sovereign Immunity. The doctrine of state
sovereign immunity has a similar exception. The leading
case is Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, in which the State of
Georgia had purchased land in Chattanooga for a railroad
yard." The City of Chattanooga wanted to condemn the
property, and Georgia sued to stop them, arguing that they
138. Id. at 7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 455(1)(c) (1987)).
139. Id.
140. This distinction between consular and private commercial land is
comparable to the distinction in tribal sovereignty between Indian country
(reservation or trust lands) and land owned by Indian tribes in fee. See supra
Part I.B.
141. Brief of Town of Lenox, supra note 135, at 10.
142. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
143. Brief of Town of Lenox, supra note 135, at 8. The FSIA provides that "[a]
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States ... in any case ... in which ... rights in immovable property situated in
the United States are at issue." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (2006)).
144. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 478 (1924).
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had sovereign immunity over the land.45 The Supreme
Court rejected Georgia's sovereign immunity claim and
found for Chattanooga.'46 The Court ruled that Georgia was
just like any other private landowner:
Land acquired by one State in another State is held subject to the
laws of the latter and to all the incidents of private ownership.
The proprietary right of the owning State does not restrict or
modify the power of eminent domain of the State wherein the land
is situated.
The Court further explained that the city's eminent domain
power "does not depend on the consent or suability of the
owner" and that as simply a private property owner,
"Georgia can claim no sovereign immunity."4
Here, the condemnation proceedings are analogous to
the foreclosure proceedings the counties are trying to bring
against OIN's land. Much like the State of Georgia, OIN
owns land privately in another state, New York. In
Chattanooga, Georgia was unable to use sovereign
immunity to escape a taking of its private property in
Tennessee. Similarly, OIN cannot use tribal sovereign
immunity to escape the forced sale of its private property in
New York, particularly since tribal sovereign immunity is
narrower than state sovereign immunity.49
Thus, allowing OIN to use tribal immunity from suit to
avoid enforcement of legitimate state property taxes levied
against it would give OIN more sovereignty than either a
foreign country or a state would enjoy-"super-
sovereign[ty]"o --which conflicts with the Supreme Court's
narrower conception of tribal sovereign immunity."'
145. Id. at 478-80.
146. Id. at 479-80.
147. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 479-80, 482.
149. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 466 (1995);
Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S.
877, 890-91 (1986); see also Brief of Town of Lenox, supra note 135, at 5, 14-15.
150. Chickasaw, 515 U.S. 450, 466 (1995).
151. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 165 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("While they are sovereign for some purposes, it is now clear that Indian
reservations do not partake of the full territorial sovereignty of States or foreign
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C. OIN's Waiver of Immunity
Finally, the Oneida Indian Nation of New York's waiver
of immunity seems to concede that tribal immunity from
suit cannot bar the counties' foreclosure proceedings. At the
end of November 2010, one month after the Supreme Court
granted the counties' writ for certiorari, OIN passed a tribal
declaration and ordinance waiving "its sovereign immunity
to enforcement of real property taxation through foreclosure
by state, county and local governments within and
throughout the United States."'52 As a result, the case was
vacated and remanded to the Second Circuit.' 3 While not
determinative, the passing of the ordinance suggests that
OIN recognized the weakness of its position and the
likelihood the Supreme Court would rule that tribal
immunit from suit does not protect against foreclosure
actions."
countries."); see also Brief of Town of Lenox, supra note 135, at 3 ("But tribes do
not retain the full sovereignty of foreign nations or the fifty states.").
152. Oneida Indian Nation, Ordinance No. 0-10-1 (2011); see also Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., Nos. 05-6408-cv, 06-5168-cv, 06-5515-
cv, 2011 WL 4978126, at *7 n.11 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2011) (text of ordinance in
footnote of Second Circuit's opinion).
153. Madison Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). In
October 2011, the Second Circuit ruled that by passing the ordinance, OIN had
abandoned any claims for relief based on tribal immunity from suit and so the
court need not reach them. Madison Cnty., 2011 WL 4978126, at *10 ("There
may well be, as the Counties urge, remaining disagreements as to whether the
OIN possessed tribal sovereign immunity from suit at the time that these cases
were before the district court and then on appeal to us in the first instance. But
these questions have now become academic.").
154. See Kathryn Fort, Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the
Unfortunate Resolution of the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYo. L. REV.
375, 403-04 (2011) ("Unfortunately, the Supreme Court granted Madison
County's petition for certiorari, which meant the case involving tribal sovereign
immunity and the Oneida Indian Nation would have been in front of one of the
most hostile Courts in recent memory. Luckily the Oneida Indian Nation waived
its sovereign immunity for this case after certiorari was granted." (footnotes
omitted)).
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IV. FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS Do NOT IMPLICATE TRIBAL
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The Second Circuit in Madison County made much of a
supposed distinction between tribal sovereignty and tribal
immunity from suit."' But they failed to recognize a
distinction critical to the resolution of the issue: the
difference between actions in personam and actions in rem
and how it affects the application of tribal immunity from
suit. Specifically, enforcement proceedings like foreclosure
are actions in rem, and tribal immunity from suit is not
implicated because the proceeding is against the property,
rather than the tribe.
A. Foreclosure Proceedings Are Actions In Rem
Jurisdiction in rem, as opposed to jurisdiction in
personam, refers to "[a] court's power to adjudicate the
rights to a given piece of property, including the power to
seize and hold it." " A court has in rem jurisdiction over a
foreclosure action because such action "culminates in a
forced sale of the property (the res) to satisfy the tax
obligation. It is not a proceeding against the delinquent
taxpayer and thus does not fall within any sovereign
immunity prohibition concerning in personam lawsuits."s7
Indeed, New York specifically recognizes that a "foreclosure
action is not a proceeding against the taxpayer; it is an in
155. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 157 (2010),
vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) ("[The tribal sovereign authority over reservation
lands] doctrine is different, however, from the doctrine of tribal immunity for
suit.... [A] tribe's immunity from suit is independent of its lands.").
156. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999).
157. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 3-4 (citing Cnty. of Yakima v.




rem proceeding directed to the tax-delinquent parcel."'
Other enforcement proceedings are similarly in rem.' 9
B. Tribal Immunity from Suit Does Not Affect Actions In
Rem
The doctrine of tribal immunity from suit is only
relevant to actions in personam, because it is the person,
not the property, who has the protection of immunity. In
actions in rem, "the property itself ... is the defendant,""
and whether its owner is subject to the court's in personam
jurisdiction is irrelevant."' Tribal immunity from suit
evolved from foreign and state sovereign immunity, which
did not apply to actions in rem. 62
Yakima, in which the Supreme Court held that Yakima
County could impose a property tax on reservation fee lands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, is the most recent case to
make the important distinction between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction.' The Court reasoned that "[w]hile
. . . in personam jurisdiction over reservation Indians ...
would [be] significantly disruptive of tribal self-government,
the mere power to assess and collect a tax on certain real
estate is not."'" Thus, in rem jurisdiction, which is targeted
at the property rather than the tribe, does not interfere with
158. Id. at 21 n.8 (citing In re Berg, 295 B.R. 698, 703 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
2003)). Madison County's foreclosure proceedings are judicial, while Oneida
County's foreclosure proceedings are administrative. Id.; see also N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 1120 (McKinney 2010) (in rem proceedings are used to foreclose
tax liens).
159. See Brief for the State of New York et al., supra note 12, at 10-12
(describing foreclosure as one of multiple "in rem remedies" that can be used
against taxable parcels of land).
160. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187 (1886).
161. Sheree R. Weisz, Case Comment, Federal Indian Law: The Erosion of
Tribal Sovereignty as the Protection of the Nonintercourse Act Continues to be
Redefined More Narrowly: Cass County Joint Water Resource District v. 1.43
Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 643 N.W2d 685, 80 N.D. L. REV. 205, 211 (2004).
162. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 13, at 25-27; see also supra Part
III.B.1-2.
163. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 265, 270 (1992).
164. Id. at 265.
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what the doctrine of tribal inmurity from suit seeks to
protect-tribal self-government.
Two state courts of last resort have made the same
distinction. In Cass County Joint Water Resource District v.
1.43 Acres of Land, the Supreme Court of North Dakota,
followinF the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v.
Heitner, 6 stated that an action in rem was an "action
against the property itself' and that in personam
jurisdiction was not required to bring such an action.'"
Similarly, in Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault
Indian Nation, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
tribal immunity from suit was only implicated in actions in
personam.'
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that seizure of
tribal personal property for collection for non-payment of
taxes is permissible.' 8 As the counties note, "[g]iven the
'primeval' importance of a sovereign's control over real
property within its jurisdiction . . . , it would be irrational to
allow in rem actions against tax-delinquent personal
property but not against tax-delinquent tribal real
property.""
V. EFFECTS OF THE MADISON COUNTY DECISION
A. Lack of Remedy
The Second Circuit's decision, before waiver of
immunity by OIN, would have left Madison and Oneida
Counties without a remedy. In Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Potawatomi Indians,
holding that while Oklahoma could collect state taxes on
165. 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977) ("The effect of a judgment in [an action in rem] is
limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal
liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court.").
166. Cass Cnty. Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land, 2002 ND 83, 1 8,
643 N.W.2d 685, 689.
167. Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation, 929 P.2d
379, 386 (Wash. 1996).
168. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980); see also Reply Brief, supra note 127, at 11.
169. Reply Brief, supra note 127, at 11 (citations omitted).
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cigarettes sold on the reservation, tribal immunity from suit
prevented Oklahoma from suing to collect the taxes owed.o70
Overriding Oklahoma's complaint that this left the State
with a "right without [a] remedy," the Court stated that
"[t]here is no doubt that sovereign immunity bars the State
from pursuing the most efficient remedy, but we are not
persuaded that it lacks any adequate alternatives," such as
"collect[ing] the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers, either
by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation, or by
assessing wholesalers who supplied unstamped cigarettes to
the tribal stores."'7
For Madison and Oneida Counties, there are no such
similar remedies. Foreclosure proceedings are essentially
the "only means of collecting [real property] taxes.""' The
Second Circuit suggests methods such as suing individual
tribe members, entering into voluntary agreements with
tribes, and petitioning Congress,"'7 but these are unlikely to
be successful.
B. Disastrous Consequences for Local Governments
The reasoning followed in Madison County also results
in several indirect, but no less significant, consequences, the
largest of which is the continuing losses in tax revenues.
For example, the failure of OIN to pay property taxes in
2006 resulted in a 20% loss in the budget of the Town of
Verona (home to Turning Stone Casino). Such a result is
especially dire considering the heavy burden OIN places on
local government resources. For example, Turning Stone
Casino uses a considerable amount of water, much more
than the 150,000 gallons per day the tribe is allotted."'
Also, the heavy traffic to the many OIN commercial
enterprises-Turning Stone Casino and its surrounding
170. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 512 (1995).
171. Id. at 514 (citations omitted).
172. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Village of Hobart, Wis., 542 F.Supp. 2d
908, 921 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
173. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 160 (2010),
vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
174. Brief of Town of Verona, supra note 5, at 5.
175. Id.
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hotels and golf courses-strains the local communities'
highway budgets because of the need for more plowing,
salting, sanding, and general maintenance of the roads."' In
addition, Turning Stone Casino is located within the Verona
volunteer fire district, which uses tax revenues to purchase
needed equipment." ' O IN requires significant coverage from
the fire district, yet pays no taxes to support it."' Finally,
the local school districts (where OIN children also go to
school) lose out on a large amount of revenue because of
OIN's failure to pay propertT taxes, which causes the taxes
of non-Indians to increase.' Therefore, "[t]he OIN enjoys
the benefits, . . . but it is the wider community, which is
99% non-Indian, which foots the bill."'o Plus, OIN enjoys an
"unfair competitive advantage over all the local businesses
that do pay their taxes.""'
The Second Circuit's decision in Madison County also
hinders the counties' ability to enforce rules apart from the
payment of taxes, such as land use and environmental
regulations. For example, in the planning and zoning
context, OIN's construction of a "casino [and] hotels,
restaurants, golf courses, gas stations, convenience stores,
and campgrounds" interferes with the "rural nature" of the
community and the importance of agribusiness within it.'82
OIN's claimed exemption from land use regulations
"undermines the local government's ability to manage
shared resources, to preserve the character of the
community and to protect the land from environmental
harm, governmental prerogatives for which the residents
have justified expectations.""' Environmental issues are
also a concern: for example, OIN's construction of its golf
courses caused the spread of smoke to surrounding areas,
and local residents worried that the lack of oversight over
chemicals and pesticides applied to maintain the courses
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id. at 7.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 10.
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would affect water runoff." Local governments in central
New York are concerned that "[t]he impact of this case
[Madison County] is far-reaching. . . . If counties cannot
enforce the payment of property taxes, then towns will
encounter similar obstacles in implementing their
municipal plans, zoning ordinances, and other laws
designed to protect public health, safety, and welfare."'
This is precisely the situation that the Supreme Court in
Sherrill wished to prevent.'
Local governments in New York are not alone in their
concern over the Madison County decision. The California
State Association of Counties submitted an amicus brief in
support of Madison and Oneida Counties which outlined the
national implications of the Second Circuit's ruling.' In the
brief, the Association explained how "a decision by [the
Supreme] Court allowing tribes to raise the defense of
sovereign immunity to prevent land use enforcement
actions on non-trust lands would create significant health
and safety issues," by providing examples of problematic
activities by Indian tribes, such as refusal to pay property
taxes or to comply with land use regulations.'
The brief also mentions another important (perhaps
unexpected) consequence of the Madison County decision-
that the process of converting fee lands to trust lands
through the Department of Interior will be obliterated.'
This is problematic because the process exists to ensure
that concerns of local governments are taken into account
when deciding whether the federal government should hold
out Indian land as exempt from state regulation.'" If the
Madison County decision and its lack of support for
enforcement methods stands, then "[m]ere purchase of
184. Id.
185. Id. at 11.
186. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 159
(2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) (noting the counties' argument that a
holding that foreclosure proceedings were not possible would "eviscerate"
Sherrill).
187. Brief of the California State Ass'n of Counties, supra note 15.
188. Id. at 5-6.
189. Id. at 10; see also supra Part I.B.2.
190. Brief of the California State Ass'n of Counties, supra note 15, at 11-12.
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property in fee would be sufficient to obviate taxes and land
use regulations."'9'
These consequences for local government are
inconsistent with the spirit behind tribal sovereignty-to
protect Indian tribes from state usurpation. 92 Instead, the
pendulum appears to have swung the other way. It is now
the local governments that need protection, as tribes are
able to utilize sovereign immunity to interfere with local
government administration.
CONCLUSION
In a decision that "defie[d] common sense,"'" the Second
Circuit held in Madison County that while Madison and
Oneida Counties could assess property taxes on fee lands
owned by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, they were
unable to foreclose on the land when OIN refused to pay the
taxes. The court mistakenly separated tax assessment from
tax enforcement, using a tortured analysis of tribal
sovereign immunity to apply tribal immunity from suit to in
rem foreclosure proceedings that are not included within it.
Further, the Madison County decision could have a severe
negative impact upon the funding and administration of
local governments across the country. Despite OIN's last-
second agreement to submit to state, county, and local
foreclosure proceedings, the Supreme Court should still
clarify that in rem enforcement proceedings like foreclosure
do not implicate a tribe's immunity from suit.
191. Id. at 12.
192. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
193. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cnty., 605 F.3d 149, 163 (2010),
vacated, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
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